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Abstract
The integration can be used in a strategic way to weaken the short-term competition, by raising the rivals’ costs, or 
long term - by increasing input costs, to prevent potential competitors. It represents the unification of production, 
distribution,  sales  and/or  any  other  economic  processes  within  the  same  organization.  The  essence  of  the 
integration decision is not represented only by the financial calculation, but also by the qualitative analysis of the 
efforts and involved effects and by the competitors’ analysis. This paper presents some appropriate approaches in 
this way, needed to be understood for achieving excellence in management.
Keywords: Integration, Competition, Excellence in management.
1. INTRODUCTION
Integration  represents  the  unification  of  production,  distribution,  sales  and/or  any other  economic 
processes  within the  same organization. Therefore,  it is  the  decision of  a  company  to  use  the 
internal resources to the detriment of market transactions in order to fulfil its purpose and 
objectives.
At a theoretical level, all the functions that an organization needs to fulfil can be accomplished through 
externalized activities, which imply concluding product delivery or services contracts.
In  practice,  companies  consider  that  it  is  more  profitable  to  realize  a  significant  part  of  the 
administrative,  production,  distribution  or  marketing  processes  needed  to  obtain  the  product,  and 
therefore the profit, by giving up the idea of concluding a contract with other firms. Companies consider 
that in this way they will be able to increase profits, to take risks and/or to coordinate more efficiently 
processes.
Actually, the integration decision becomes a “buying or purchasing” decision. This way, the emphasis is 
placed upon the financial aspects involved in such a decision by estimating the savings that can be 
made as a result of integration, and comparing them with the necessary investment that needs to be 
made. 68
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2. THE INTEGRATION DECISION
2.1. Partial integration and full integration of a company
However,  the  integration  decision  is  not  defined  merely  by  this  calculation.  The  essence  of  the 
integration decision is not represented only by the financial calculation, but also by the qualitative 
analysis of the efforts and involved effects. In addition to measuring the costs of the investments, it is 
necessary  to  approach  the  strategically  aspects  of  market  and  review  efforts  for  an  effective 
management  of  an  integrated  entity.  The  difficulty  of  this  approach is  given  by  the  complexity  of 
quantifying the factors involved in the integration process. In conclusion, the integration decision is 
taken according to the assessment, at a strategic level, of the advantages and the integration 
costs, both in direct and indirect economic terms (Porter, 2001a).
Furthermore, it is imperative to consider that the company is a system, which means that it has a 
dynamic character. This evolutionary valence makes the system to be characterized by its own time, 
consistent with its motion laws, and is subject to a multitude of contradictions, and internal and external 
actions, and by solving these he achieved the state of dynamic equilibrium (Ratiu-Suciu, 2000). The 
same author considers that in the area of systems theory it can not be applied the simple logic of 
mathematics,  which  explains  the  features  of  a  system  based  solely on  its  components,  but  are 
considered the phenomena of synergy, which give the system stronger characteristics than those which 
would result from the simple "summation" of the characteristics of the parties. Integration is such an 
action  that  generates  synergy  components  of  a  company.  The  synergistic  effect  is  related  to  the 
appearance in the system of a series of features that occur only in the whole system, and don't appear 
in any of the component systems. The main reason for this is that the spiral of knowledge everlastingly 
expands due to the application of knowledge to knowledge (Plumb and Zamfir, 2011).
The  synergistic  effect  includes  the  emergent  effect  (Ratiu-Suciu,  2000),  as  a  phenomenon  which 
appears  together  with  the  establishment  of  the  system  as  a  unitary  whole.  This  determines  the 
agglomeration, coupling, accumulation and concentration of elements effects, and is generated by the 
fact that the system, as a whole, has certain features that can't be found in its components.
It is also noted that a company can opt for partial integration, which in the specialty literature it is 
known under the name of conic integration (Porter, 2001b). This means that the company meets some 
of its needs internally, and for covering the rest it uses outside contracting. Consequently, there is the 
idea of a certain degree of integration in the activity. In this context, in order to find the most suitable Corbos R. A.





































































integration  degree  for  a  company,  it is  appropriate  to  compare  the  economic  and  administrative 
advantages of integration with the economic and administrative costs.
Identifying the balance between advantages and costs will vary depending on the activity sector and the 
strategic positioning of the organization. Also, the benefits and costs are influenced by the type of 
policy that the company adopts: full integration (or cvasi-integration) or partial inside integration 
(conic integration). Even more, advantages can be increased without incurring all costs, even in the 
case of a cvasi-integration, by employing loans  or by issuing shares. Conic integration means a 
partial integration, upstream or downstream, but also purchasing the rest of needs from the 
external environment (Porter, 2001a). The main risk, in the case of conic integration, is that the small 
size of the company – generally and the integration – in particular, diminish the net benefit, or it can 
even generate losses. From here it results the concern of the company to maintain the efficiency of its 
internal processes, and to only use the external resources for completeness. 
Understanding the factors that determine which type of transactions are mediated through the market, 
and which transactions are mediated through vertical integration within the companies, has represented 
an important research subject, theoretically and in practice, in the microeconomics area within the last 
25 years. In addition, vertical integration and vertical contractual arrangements, non-standard (so-called 
“vertical constraints”), have drawn the attention, over time, of the U.S. and E.U. Antitrust laws. 
2.2. Theories of vertical integration
In the specialty literature (Joskow, 2006), there is no unique theory of vertical integration. Part of the 
vertical integration studies are focused on the simple dichotomy between the decision "to make" inside 
and  "to  purchase"  through  the  market,  but  in  reality  these  two  types  of  behaviour are  related.  A 
comprehensive  analysis  of  the  root  causes  and  consequences  of  vertical  integration  includes  an 
examination of the factors that generate the boundaries between firms and markets and also, the origins 
of various non-standard contractual arrangements (or “hybrid forms”) that stand in the way of simple, 
anonymous and spontaneous market transactions and internal organization. These hybrid forms include 
various types of long-term contracts, franchise contracts, non-linear pricing arrangements, agreements 
to maintain resale prices, demand contracts, joint ventures, dual supply and others. Depending on 
circumstances,  these  alternative  contractual  arrangements  could  represent  a  perfect  or  imperfect 
replacement for vertical integration, in situations in which is necessary to cope with issues that may 
arise  if  it  is  based  on  market  relations  – simple,  spontaneous,  repeated  – between  downstream 
companies and upstream ones. Practically, all theories on vertical integration refer to any kind of market 
imperfections. This orientation is in fact deviations from a long list of implicit and explicit assumptions 70
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that  are  associated  with  models  of  perfect  competition  and  anonymous  and  spontaneous  market 
transactions, performed under the principle of perfect competition. Neoclassical approaches on vertical 
integration had the tendency to focus primarily (but not exclusively) on vertical integration as a response 
to issues already in the market, or as a necessary strategic move to create or increase market power in 
ascending or descending markets.
Are not excluded the reasoning for vertical integration, the theories on vertical integration based on 
organizational economics (the economics of transaction costs), that are based on the recognition of the 
fact that companies which follow to perform transactions face a variety of potential transaction costs, 
contractual costs and organizational threats, which are related to transaction characteristics discussed. 
These transaction costs include direct costs of drafting, monitoring and enforcement of contracts, as 
well as investment costs associated with ex ante and ex post performance deficiencies, which may arise 
as  a  consequence  of  contractual  risks  associated  with  transactions  conducted  through  market 
arrangements  and  bureaucratic  costs  associated  with  internal  organization.  The  framework  which 
includes the economics of transaction costs, bears in mind the fact that vertical integration, from the 
perspective of firms, has both costs and benefits. The chosen management structures, either vertical 
integration or vertical contractual arrangements, or simple market transactions, reflect the efforts of the 
companies involved to reduce inefficiencies that might otherwise be related to the investment decisions 
ex ante, as well as ex post performance, both as part of the exchange relationship.
Price  discrimination: Opportunities to  practice  price  discrimination by selling goods or intermediary 
services to downstream firms, from various industries, occur when the derived demand elasticity of 
intermediate goods varies from one industry to another. The differences in derived demand elasticity 
create the opportunity of a monopoly upstream to participate, in a profitable way, as a third party, to 
price discrimination - by charging a higher price to downstream companies in the industry, which have a 
lower elasticity derived demand, and a lower price to downward industry companies, which have a 
derived  demand  elasticity  higher.  However,  the  monopoly  of  the  downstream  tries  to  block  the 
companies in the industry that pay lower prices, thanks to a profitable resale of intermediate good 
towards firms from the declining industry, which pay higher prices. This situation effectively blocks the 
price discrimination strategy by third party. Blocking resale is always a problem which a company that 
aims to engage in price discrimination by a third party faces. An effective way to block resale is: a 
downstream monopoly to vertically integrate into an industry with a higher elasticity derived for the 
intermediary good (Perry, 1978). Thus, the vertically integrated firm sells only the intermediate good to
"external" buyers at a price that maximizes profit, and which reflects the lowest elasticity of demand 
from the other industry. Corbos R. A.





































































In this case, the vertically integrated company can charge a lower price because it knows its marginal 
cost of production for the intermediate good, and can set a price that maximizes profit for the product 
they sell in the downstream industry,  by taking into account a higher elasticity of demand for the 
product, which now is produced by vertically integrated company; this price is lower than the one 
perceived to other "outside" buyers. Unintegrated downstream firms that compete in an industry where 
the monopoly was integrated can buy the intermediate good price only at an "external" higher price, 
designed to integrate the monopoly taxes from the companies in the other industry, which have a lower 
elasticity than the request. If these firms aren't more efficient in the production process on a downstream 
market, where the companies have integrated linear, then the consequence will be that the companies 
from this market will not be able to compete with a vertically integrated company, because the costs will 
be much higher, due to high prices which they now have to pay for intermediary good. This is a classic 
way to impose a price. Despite the fact that the upstream company has expanded its monopoly in one 
of the downstream markets, the market prices could fall - compared to the level that it could have been 
if  the  upstream  firm  would  have  remained  independent and  would  have  charged  a  uniform  price 
monopoly to companies in both industries. Similarly, price will increase in the industries with a low 
elasticity of demand, where the upstream company has not been integrated.
Another possible argument for vertical integration is the "clandestine rider" issue related to providing 
pre-sales and after-sales information by retailers who are in competition (Joskow, 2006). Here, the 
upstream companies produce differentiated or brand goods, so they face a downward demand curve for 
each product. In addition, the company’s products demand is affected by final sales, disadvantages and 
associated costs, which are made by the retailers of their products. If retailers cannot fully realize the 
benefits of their own distribution service costs, but instead can learn the benefits of those with whom 
they compete, this "horizontal externality" will cause, from the manufacturer’s point of view, the retailers 
to invest less in the distribution service. Vertical integration is a potential solution to this problem. This 
would allow the industry to internalize the value of upstream costs in the sales and distribution services. 
There  are  also  various  combinations  of  exclusive  territorial  arrangements,  tariff  resale  price 
maintenance agreements, transfer of profits and other vertical contractual arrangements.
2.3. Vertical integration and competition
Vertical integration can be used in a strategic way to weaken the short-term competition, by raising the 
rivals’ costs, or long term – by increasing input costs, to prevent potential competitors.
In  this  context,  it  is  necessary  not  to  confuse  "vertical  integration"  with  "closed  market",  which  is 
sometimes associated with vertical integration. When a firm vertically integrates and provides its own 72
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resources, other potential suppliers are, to some extent, "excluded" from providing those resources by 
the vertically integrated company. According to this definition, any vertical integration “limits (excludes) 
competition”.
The classic case of vertical anti-competitive exclusion occurs when there is a monopoly on the provision 
of an "essential facility" or "vital resource" input, to which the competitor or potential competitor firms 
need access, in comparable terms and conditions. This argument is dismantled in a series of cases. 
When the access price to an essential facility is regulated, the company which controls it may consider 
advantageous to restrict the access to it, in order to restrict the access to non-regulated markets (on 
which the owner of the essential facility also competes as a supplier) (Beard et al., 2001). 
Arguments in favour of vertical exclusion occur often, because regulated, vertically integrated 
monopolies are subject to certain public policies that create opportunities for competitors to 
enter certain markets, on which operate only vertically integrated companies. For example, the 
development of competitive supplying electricity markets require that the generators that are in the 
competition, and their consumers, to have access to a distribution network, which naturally features a 
monopole (Joskow, 1997). A firm that controls the distribution network, and is also a player on the 
electricity market could be interested and could have the ability to impose terms and conditions relating 
to the access to that network in order to reduce competition on the competitive energy market. The price 
regulation continues, and in particular, subsidies which attract uncompetitive entries on the market, and 
which  create  extra  complexities  regarding  the  decision  to  enter  a  market  and  use  strategies  of 
exclusion.
3. CONCLUSION
How could a company increase the supply costs for another firm, without increasing their own costs? If 
a firm is vertically integrated with a supplier and can afford not to sell to another company, then the 
other provider, which is in the upstream and is independent, holds the supply monopoly. Consequently, 
it may increase the price it asks for the resources it sells to this company that is not integrated; at its 
turn this company will offset the price increase by increasing its own prices, leading the other company 
(which is vertically integrated) to increase the price. Prices rise, as well as the profits of the vertically 
integrated firm and the unintegrated company.Corbos R. A.
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